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There appear to be currently available three kinds of argument in favour of 
the claim that there ought to be limitations on how comprehensively the 
market is allowed to operate. This is the claim, put simply, that there ought to 
be things (what Margaret Jane Radin calls “contested commodities”1, such as 
education, human organs, insurance, slaves, sex, pornography) that money 
cannot buy.  The first kind of argument appeals to the undesirable 
consequences of commodifing a certain good (or set of goods): for instance, that 
commodifing a certain good (or set of goods) will lead to our developing 
defective preferences, or lead to greater overall violence, unjust allocation of 
goods, or might encourage the exploitation of the vulnerable.  The second 
kind of argument appeals to whether commodifing a certain good violates 
someone (or a group of person’s) rights. The third kind of argument (a 
“semiotic argument”) appeals to whether a commodifing a good communicates 
morally objectionable messages.  
I here intend to introduce and defend a particular version of how such a 
semiotic argument argument might go, an argument that is not assailed by 
what I take to be the central problem with other semiotic arguments. For 
example, in recent work, Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski (Brennan and 
Jaworski 2015 (a) 2015(b)) argue that if we can regulate the market such that it 
                                                        
1 Cf. Radin 1997. 
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would have no negative moral consequences, and such that it violated no 
person’s moral rights, then no semiotic case against commodification can 
succeed. This is because, according to them (and plausibly in my opinion), the 
market has no intrinsic meaning per se. I think that people who raise this kind 
of worry are right to point out that the meaning of the market – and what it 
means for any given good to be commodified - is contingent. I am just going 
to assume this to be true here. 
 
However, I want to argue that because some goods are both 
incommensurable and yet comparable, the comparability between some 
goods is dependent on our making a specific kind of value choice, where we 
create the mechanism through which the goods can be compared. There may 
indeed be cultures where buying sex (or organs, friendship, or education, for 
example) does not express disrespect. But in all cultures buying goods of 
incommensurable (but comparable) value expresses the fact that the value of 
that good has been compared with other values, and that a mechanism for 
such a comparison has been created2.  I hope to show how the fact that we 
may have reason to resist signalling comparability between goods of 
incommensurable value underwrites the continence of semiotic arguments 
against the commodification of certain goods.  
 
                                                        
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee at Analysis for discussion here.  
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I proceed as follows: in §II, I articulate familiar ‘semiotic’ arguments against 
the commodification of certain goods which end up really being 
consequentialist arguments and zero in on a particular anti-commodification 
argument that I argue can properly be called a semiotic argument. In §III, I 
formulate the semiotic argument I wish to defend -a variation of the last 
argument formulated in §II  - via considerations about incommensurable 




Consider this familiar anti-commodification argument that one finds in (for 
instance) Anderson 1995, Sandel 2012, and Walzer 1984:  
 
The Signalling Instrumental Value Argument (SIVA) 
 
(i) If a good is commodified, then the market signals that it is of 
instrumental (and not intrinsic, or final) value. [Premise] 
(ii) Some goods are of intrinsic or final value. [Premise] 
(iii) Goods of intrinsic or final value ought not to be presented as 
having merely instrumental value. [Premise] 
(iv) Some goods ought not to be commodified. [From (i) – (iii)] 
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Premise (iii) is often defended via appeal to Kantian Autonomy - because a 
good that one person might consider to have intrinsic value is presented, qua 
commodified good, as having merely instrumental value, the possibility of 
that person’s expressing her valuation is denied, thus violating her autonomy. 
As Elizabeth Anderson puts it, the market then needs to be regulated such 
that we: “secure the robust sphere differentiation required to create a 
significant range of options through which people can express a wide range 
of valuations” (Anderson 1995: 141). Implicit here is also some support for 
premise (ii); namely that people vary hugely in their valuations of things, and 
what some assign instrumental value, others assign intrinsic or final value. 
Technically, though, this really supports a slightly weaker premise: 
 
(ii’) Some goods are taken to have intrinsic value. 
 
Brennan and Jaworski have labelled this kind of argument the Wrong Signal 
Objection and present us with reason for challenging premise (i). Their 
thought is the following: the meaning of the market (what it signifies) is 
contingent.  It is us who ascribe to the market the symbolic meaning that it 
does. Suppose then that there is no good consequentialist anti-
commodification argument to be had. It surely follows that we then ought to 
regulate or modify what the market means to us, where it means something 
negative, rather than, say, make it the case that certain goods cannot be 
bought or sold. As they put it, they defend the claim “that if there are no other 
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deontic concerns about the markets aside from semiotics, if there are no 
worries about wrongful exploitation, harm to others, rights violations and so 
on, then consequentialist considerations allow us to judge the semiotics of 
market transactions” (Brennan and Jaworski 2015 (a): 14).   
 
Let us call such an argumentative move against semiotic arguments the 
collapsing move. It seems to me that the collapsing move presents proponents of 
semiotic arguments with a serious challenge: present an argument that does 
not show that we must reform the meaning we assign the commodification of 
goods, or of a particular good, without the argument “collapsing” into a 
consequentialist argument – given that the market has no intrinsic meaning 
per se. This paper is an attempt to meet this challenge3.  
 
The collapsing move is predicated on the assumption that the symbolic 
meaning of the market is contingent, in that if the market does not lead to the 
consequences predicted by its putative meaning, then it is up to us to change 
or at least ignore that meaning. I am going to grant my opponent that claim; 
however, I wish to challenge the validity of an inference moving from that 
claim to the conclusion that no semiotic arguments succeed. I think the 
following argument is a good semiotic argument and consistent with any data 
that might support the claim that we have a certain amount of freedom with 
respect to what meaning we assign to the commodification of goods.  
                                                        
3 I am assuming, for charity with respect to philosophers like Brennan and Jaworski, 
that the idea of regulating or modifying semiotic meaning makes sense, and/or is 




The Argument from Signalling Value Choice (ASVC) 
 
(v) If a market signals that a good is commodified, then the market 
signals that it is a good that can be bought and sold. [Premise] 
(vi) If a good can be bought and sold, then its relative signalled value is 
either commensurable or proto-on-a-par. [Premise]  
(vii) If some good’s (signalled) value is proto-on-a-par, then that good 
cannot exist in a market qua a contingently-signalled-as-x good. 
[Premise] 
(viii) Some commodified goods have signalled proto-on-a-par value. 
[Premise] 
(ix) Some commodified goods cannot exist in a market qua contingently-
signalled-as-x goods. [from vii, viii]  
(x) If (ix), then the very act of signalling commodification expresses a 
valuation of certain goods.  [Premise] 
(xi) There are some goods whose value for a society should not be 
expressed. [Premise] 
(xii) There are semiotic reasons for thinking that there are some goods 
that ought not to be commodified. [from v, vi, ix, x, xi]. 
 
Let me clarify my terminology. For me, two values are: 
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Commensurable:  if either one of the values can be determined to be *all 
things considered* more valuable, or both values can be 
determined to be equally of all things considered value. 
 
Incommensurable:  if not-commensurable. 
 
Comparable:  if one can make a rational choice with respect to choosing 
between them. 
 
On a par:   if they are incommensurable and comparable.  
 
Proto-on-a-par:  if they are incommensurable and comparable and have 
either been compared or the “mechanism" for comparing 
them has been created.  
 
Contingently-signaled-as-x:  if there is a way in which (at least in 
theory) all of what their relative values 




In the next section, I will defend premises (vi) – (ix) and explain further what I 
mean by proto-on-a-par value, a notion I borrow (and slightly modify) from the 




As I mentioned, premise (v) is analytically true, so let me begin by explaining 
and defending the following premise: 
 
(vi) If a good can be bought and sold, then its value is either  
commensurable or proto-on-a-par. 
 
To help make my case, I think it is useful to contrast the premise above with 
the following premise: 
 
(i’) If a good can be bought or sold, then that good is treated as if it 
is of commensurable value. 
 
I think it is tempting to treat (i’) as analytically true. The whole point of a 
good’s being in a market is that it is assigned some (perhaps numerical) value 
such that its value can be easily compared and measured vis-à-vis the value of 
other goods. This just is to treat it as if its value is commensurable (regardless 
of what this signals).  
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But I think that goods can be bought and sold without treating them as 
having commensurable value4. Here is where Ruth Chang’s notion of the 
value of two goods (or values) being on a par is useful. Put simply, suppose 
you are an undergraduate trying to decide between taking up a career in 
banking and taking up further graduate study in philosophy. Both career 
options have their relative merits; relative to the aim of making money, the 
banking career seems the better option. But from the point of view of 
someone who wants to dedicate themselves to investigating interesting 
things, graduate study in philosophy might be best. All things considered, 
however, there does not seem to be one, overall better, option. Does this mean 
that the respective values of graduate study in philosophy and taking up a 
career in banking are incomparable? Chang thinks that would too strong a 
conclusion, since it would mean that no rational choice between the two 
options is possible - but yet clearly people often make these kinds of career 
choice and it seems pretty revisionary to call all these choices irrational. 
Further: “if A is neither better nor worse than B, and A and B are not equally 
good, A and B may nevertheless be comparable – they may be on a par” 
(Chang 2002: 662).  
 
The interesting thing about goods that are on a par with one another, is that 
because they are comparable, we can make a rational choice as to how to 
                                                        
4 The common view is that exchange always presupposes commensurability, cf. 
Pantich 2016 for an overview.  
 10 
adequately compare the two goods even though they are incommensurable. 
Choosing between them is not an arbitrary matter. The agent making a choice 
between goods that are on a par does not make the choice arbitrarily – she 
creates, in choosing, laws for herself that make rational one choice over the 
other. Put differently, she decides who she is. In choosing to stay at graduate 
school, she chooses to become a Philosopher, and in so doing self-constitutes 
laws for herself.  
 
In order to use this to defend premise (vi), I now want to introduce the notion 
of proto-on-a-par goods, which I define as follows:  
 
Proto-on-a-par good:  a good g that is incommensurable, and would be on a 
par with other goods (for a subject or group of subjects S) 
had not S exercised some choice with respect to g such 
that S has created the rules by which g can be compared 
with other goods. 
 
Suppose, for instance, that the value of £10 is incommensurable with that of a 
10 minute friendship. As I mentioned, the fact that the two values are 
incommensurable does not mean that they are not comparable – they may be 
on a par. We can create the mechanism via which to compare them by making 
a choice. We can decide that 1 minute of friendship is worth £1 to us. Thus the 
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incommensurable values become comparable, the goods become proto-on-a-
par.  
 
If there are such things as proto-on-a-par goods, then we can see why (i’) (and 
not (vi)) fails – the fact that a good can be bought or sold may make it 
comparable, but it need not be commensurable (either better or worse than 
another good, or else equally good). And once we are granted premise (vi), 
the rest of the premises in SAVC can be straightforwardly defended. Take 
(vii), to start with: 
 
(vii)  If some good’s (signalled) value is proto-on-a-par, then that good 
cannot exist in a market qua a contingently-signalled-as-x good. 
 
Premise (vii) is analytically true, given our definition of proto-on-a-par value. If 
what is being signalled is value-choice (a move from on-a-par to proto-on-a-
par), there is no way to reform the fact that it signals value-choice without 
removing that good from the market. This differs with goods that are 
commensurable, since their commodification merely illustrates their 
commensurability. Recall that by ‘value choice’ I have a specific thing in 
mind: that one determines the mechanism that enables comparison between 
on a par goods by choosing the person that one wants to be (or the society that 
one wants to be at a macro level).5 
                                                        
5 I assume that there is some objective fact of the matter about what goods are on a 
par. But one may think that there is no such thing, and run the same argument 
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(viii) Some commodified goods have (signalled) proto-on-a-par value. 
[Premise] 
 
Some commodified goods surely do not have commensurable value. This 
probably follows from the fact that some goods have intrinsic, or final, value. 
It also might be the case that some goods with instrumental value are also 
incommensurable, at least relative to other goods, such as money. If so, then it 
is possible that some goods that are signalled as having been commodified, 
are signalled as not having commensurable value.  
 
Premise (ix) just follows from (vii, viii); so next we have: 
 
(x) If (ix), then the very act of signalling commodification expresses 
a valuation of certain goods.   
 
The point in premise (ix) is that – contrary to what philosophers who find the 
collapsing move appealing might assume – there are some commodified goods 
whose existence in the market is such that it is not up to us what symbolic 
message to assign them, or their commodification (while they continue to be 
on the market). Their existence in the market comes already with some 
                                                                                                                                                              
starting from that premise, such that determining that two values are on a par is 
already a value choice. I think this way of making the argument is a little more 
theoretically cost-heavy, since it amounts to holding, in effect, that really all goods’ 
value is proto-on-a-par. Thanks again to an anonymous referee at Analysis for 
discussion here.  
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symbolic message – that value choice has been made. That establishes 
premise (x), so let’s consider the next:   
 
(xi) There are some goods whose value for a society should not be 
expressed. 
 
Premise (xi) is a substantive premise. I think all I need to do here is give the 
form of its defence. This is because (xi) is not question-begging, in the sense 
that someone who runs the collapsing move might well endorse it. Put 
differently, it may well be true, even if the meaning we assign to the market is 
contingent.  What the collapsing move presupposes is that, given that the 
semiotic meaning of goods is contingent, we can modify any contingently 
assigned meaning to a good without withdrawing it from the market. When we 
assign proto-on-a-par value to a good (relative to another good) by putting it in 
a market, we signal that it is proto-on-a-par when we signal that it is a good 
that is on the market (that is, we say that it is something that we can compare 
even if its relative value relative is incommensurable). Our assigning this 
meaning is indeed contingent, in the sense that we choose whether or not 
something goes on the market. And, further, our creating the mechanism for 
comparison (by putting it on the market) does not determine what its relative 
value is with respect to another good, and what semiotic meaning we might 
give to assigning that relative value. We are thus entitled to think – for all I’ve 
said – that the semiotic meaning we give to a given good’s being on the 
 14 
market is in a sense up to us, and thus theoretically revisable. But, it does not 
follow, without further argument, that – when there are no bad consequences 
to a good’s being on the market, or any other deontic concerns6 such as rights 
violations – we can revise all the semiotic meaning its being there has while 
keeping that good on the market. This is because where there something 
wrong about our signalling that a given good has proto-on-a-par value relative 
to another good, there will be no way of revising what its being on a market 
signals without either withdrawing it from the market, or else somehow 
supressing the fact that it is on the market. But I take it that an argument that 
would show that the meaning that a good’s being on the market has should 
be supressed qualifies as a semiotic argument. 
 
To illustrate: the value of sex and the value of money are plausibly 
incommensurable. But they are not (also plausibly) incomparable - they are on a 
par, and we can make a rational choice between them. My claim here is that 
when sex, for example, is commodified, the market has to signal that we have 
made a choice as to the relative value of sex with respect to money. That is 
because we turned it into a proto-on-a-par good for us.  This means that by 
commodyfing sex, we must signal that sex is a proto-on-a-par good – on pain of 
otherwise being unable to compare it. When sex is on the market, we may 
object to the relative value the market signals it has with respect to money (we 
                                                        
6 ‘Deontic concerns’ here being specifically about rights “worries about wrongful 
exploitation, harm to others, rights violations and so on”, as treated by rights-based 
arguments against commodification. 
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value it too little, say), or we may object that the commodification of sex 
signals disrespect towards fellow persons. Both of these things can (arguably) 
be reformed, without our ceasing to commodify sex. But if the objection is 
that we ought not to signal value choice with respect to sex and money then there is 
no way to reform the market or the meanings we assign it in order to meet the 
objection. That is, if we think that there is something wrong with signalling 
that sex has proto-on-a-par value relative to money, then there is nothing we 
can do to fix what the market signals about sex. What we must do is stop 
commodifing sex, or have refrained from commodifing it in the first place.  
 
One might wonder what if anything could be wrong with signalling proto-on-
a-par value. Here is one thing (I think there may be others): A person can 
choose to make a value choice between two goods that are on a par. A person 
can also choose not to make such a value choice. That is, a person can reflect 
who they have decided to be by not making a choice, and thus by not turning 
a good that is on a par, into to a good that is proto on a par. If they signal that 
they have made a value choice, when they have not made such a choice, then 
at least part of what is wrong in signalling value choice is that they are being 
hypocritical or (even if unintentionally) dishonest. Fairly straightforwardly, I 
think a similar thing can be said about collective value choices. A community 
of people can choose to make a value choice between goods that are on a par, 
and that community may also choose not to make such a choice. For instance, 
a community may choose not to make a value choice with respect to sex and 
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money (goods which we are plausibly held to be on a par). In other words, a 
community may choose to think that sex ought not to be proto-on-a-par 
relative to money. If sex is commodified, I am claiming, then the market 
necessarily signals that it has proto-on-a-par value (as well as signalling other 
contingent, revisable things). The moral wrong of signalling the 
commodification of sex is that it reflects something about who we are, and it 
is something we have chosen not to be7. The commodification is not wrong 
because of some consequence it may have, nor because someone’s rights have 
been violated in the act of commodification – it’s wrong simply because its 
communication is dishonest. And the fact that value choice has been 
communicated is not an item in our interpretation of the process that we can 
adjust.  
Is the fact that we (collectively) think the choice should not have been made 
contingent? Yes, even if true or correct, it is possible that we might have had 
different beliefs, or value judgements.  Should we change these beliefs (or 
value judgements)?8 But all of our beliefs are in that sense contingent (even 
beliefs in necessary truths, since we can imagine a world where we never 
                                                        
7 I assume – following Korsgaard (1996) and other Kantians – that there is always 
something morally wrong with this. Obviously, one may want to resist this. I remind 
the reader that all I am trying to do is show how there is a valid semiotic argument 
that evades the collapsing view. I do not have the space to defend all my auxiliary 
assumptions.  
8 I assume that we can have collective beliefs and values, and that what are our 
collective beliefs and values is as clear as what are our individual beliefs and values. 
I think our best theories about the metaphysics of belief allow this, given that strict 
occurentist theories (according to which S believes that p just in case p is somehow 
present in S’s current conscious mental state) have the unpalatable consequence of 
making it impossible to ascribe beliefs to sleeping persons, and dispositionalist 
theories of belief seem to have the problematic consequence of allowing S to believe 
that p even though S have never even considered p. See Thicke (2017) for discussion.  
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considered those truths), so the mere fact of contingency alone is not enough 
to revise them else we’ll be revising them ad infinitum. We should revise 
them only if they appear false to us (we have subjective evidence that they are 
false). The market’s signalling that we have made a choice is not subjective 
evidence that we ought not to make a choice (de jure) – it is merely subjective 
evidence that a choice has been made (de facto).   
 
Have we made ourselves open to a collapsing move by making these claims? 
The opponent might think that we have since, on this account, it may appear 
that what is really regulating whether something should be commodified is 
whether a choice should have actually have been made – not whether that 
choice should have been communicated.  Crucially, however, given that the 
choice we are talking about relates to how to compare two values that are on a 
par, then it looks like there is going to be no independent fact of the matter 
(and so no fact about consequences or violation of rights – on pain of the 
goods to be compared failing to be on a par) about whether the choice should 
have been made beyond facts concerning our self-determination, about our 
freely choosing who we want to be. And we can freely choose to go to law-
school and reject a career in philosophy (for example) while respecting any 
transcendental limits to this ability to choose, while respecting choice-making 
as such.9 
                                                        
9 For valuable feedback and discussion on earlier drafts of this paper I thank warmly: 
two anonymous referees at Analysis, Boudewijn De Bruin, Andrew Chitty, Jacopo 
Domenicucci, Gordon Finlayson, Alex Oliver, Marco Meyer, Tom Simpson, Kathleen 






Anderson, E. 1995: Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
University Press). 
Brennan, J. and Peter Jaworski 2015 (a): Markets without Symbolic Limits.  
Ethics 125 (4) 1053 - 1077. 
---------------------------------------- 2015 (b): Markets without Limits: Moral Virtues  
and Commercial Interests (London: Routledge). 
Chang, R. 2002: The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 659 – 688. 
Korsgaard, C. 1996: The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press). 
Panitch, V. 2016: Commodification and Exploitation in Reproductive  
Markets. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33(2) 1 – 8. 
Radin, J.M. 1997: “Market-inalienability” Harvard Law Review 100 1849 –  
1937. 
Sandel, M. 2012: What Money Can’t Buy (New York: Farrar, Straus and  
Giroux). 
Satz, D. 2010: Why some things should not be for sale (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press). 
Thicke, M. 2017: Market Epistemology. Synthese Online First:  
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-017-1464-2. 
Walzer, M. 1984: Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books). 
 
 
